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INTRODUCTION
Professional service firms (PSFs) such as management consultancies, investment banks, 
and accounting and law firms have gained positions of strong economic and social influ-
ence in today’s Western economies. The largest PSFs rival multinational corporations in 
turnover and employment, and many have extended their services beyond the business, 
politics, and nonprofit sectors (Empson, 2007b; Greenwood, Suddaby, & McDougald, 
2006). Management consultants have established themselves as “the world’s newest pro-
fession” (McKenna, 2006) and “market protagonists” (Faust, 2002b: 45) in knowledge 
economies; elite law firms act as “sanctifiers” of international business transactions whose 
influence in many instances supplants, rather than supplements, the role of the state 
(Flood, 2007), and investment banks are claiming to be doing no less than “God’s work” 
(Arlidge, 2009).
This success is to some extent a product of economic trends towards increasing knowl-
edge intensity, servitization, globalization, and rapid innovation—however, by no means 
exclusively. A considerable part of PSF success is due to professionals’ rhetorical and 
political skills actively to influence the institutional environment in which they operate. 
For instance, investment banks have shaped the “rules of the game” by embedding 
former regulators in their ranks or placing loyal employees in prominent political posi-
tions who then reinforced the myth of the inevitable “innovation cycle” and legitimized 
the deregulation of financial markets (Davis, 2009; Economist, 2007). Similarly, research 
on management fads and fashions has repeatedly recognized how management consult-
ants strategically shape management discourse in a way that establishes their own prod-
ucts and innovations as sources of commercial success (Abrahamson, 1991; Benders & 
van Veen, 2001; Berglund & Werr, 2000; Kieser, 1997; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001).
Specifically with regard to management consulting, however, these studies have 
focused on the isomorphic pressures that consultants’ efforts exert on their clients’ indus-
tries. With few exceptions (e.g. Fincham & Clark, 2002; Lounsbury, 2002, 2007; 
Montgomery & Oliver, 2007), we know little about how emerging professions, such as 
management consulting, professionalize and establish their services as a taken- for- 
granted element of social life. This is surprising given that professionals have long been 
recognized as “institutional agents” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008) (see Chapter 
17) and professionalization projects have been closely associated with institutionalization 
(DiMaggio, 1991).
Therefore, in this chapter we take a closer look at a specific type of entrepreneurship 
in PSFs; drawing on the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Hardy & Maguire, 2008) we describe some generic 
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strategies by which proto- professions can enhance their “institutional capital” (Oliver, 
1997), that is, their capacity to extract institutionally contingent resources such as legiti-
macy, reputation, or client relationships from their environment. In the next section we 
introduce the theoretical origin and core argument of the concept of institutional entre-
preneurship. We then review the literature on institutional entrepreneurship, distinguish-
ing two phases of theory development that are associated with a varying degree of 
empirical attention to institutional entrepreneurship in PSFs. In the subsequent section, 
we present some of our own work on institutional entrepreneurship in the maturing man-
agement consulting field. The chapter closes with a reflection and discussion of implica-
tions for future research.
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORETICAL 
ORIGIN AND CORE ARGUMENT
Interested in the similarity and stability of organizational structures, institutionalists 
initially focused on explaining convergent change in response to isomorphic pressures 
within organizational fields (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1987; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1977, 1983). Their over- emphasis on the social 
environment imposing upon – rather than also emerging from – human interaction, 
however, produced increasing dissatisfaction with their inability to conceptualize diver-
gent change (e.g. Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Oliver, 1991, 1992). Specifically, the “paradox 
of embedded agency” (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002), the question of how actors 
become motivated and enabled to transform the taken- for- granted structures and norms 
that supposedly define them, has attracted substantial attention.
In response, institutional scholars re- focused on explaining the role of interest and 
agency in divergent institutional change and, following DiMaggio’s (1988) early lead, 
subsumed their efforts under the banner of “institutional entrepreneurship.” This initial 
framing informed subsequent research in two ways: First, it pointed to the centrality of 
interest, agency, and resources for explaining institutionalization as a process rather than 
a state (e.g. Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Secondly, it opened 
institutional arguments to ideas from the co- evolving entrepreneurship literature (e.g. 
Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Aldrich & Martinez, 2001). The core argument of the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, hence, centers on the conditions and mechanisms that enable 
entrepreneurs actively to shape their institutional environment from within.
In contrast to earlier work which portrayed change as contingent upon an exogenous 
shock “smacking into stable institutional arrangements” (Clemens & Cook, 1999: 447), 
this strand suggests that “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient 
resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests that 
they value highly” (DiMaggio, 1988: 14). This change in perspective is initially fuelled by 
an injection of “old” institutionalist notions of interest dissatisfaction and power into the 
“new” institutionalism in organizational analysis. The resultant “neo”- institutionalist 
lens is sensitive both to actors’ conflicting interests and to their embeddedness in broader 
social structures that assess their appropriateness and control the resources to pursue 
them (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). In this sense, 
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organizations are seen as “infused with value” (Selznick, 1957: 17) in two ways: Their 
structures reflect collective notions of appropriateness, but also constitute vehicles for 
realizing individual interests.
In the institutional entrepreneurship literature, however, the pursuit of self- interest is 
not contained within organizational boundaries. Instead, when conceptualized as a posi-
tional system in which actors compete for various forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1993; 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), rather than a pure network of actors, the organizational 
field becomes the arena—and its institutional arrangement the focus—of competition 
between self- interested entrepreneurs. As “the constitutive rules of any system . . . create 
positions allocating authoritative decision making to incumbents of some positions and 
duties to obey to incumbents of others” (Stryker, 2000: 179–80), motivation to (re- )shape 
such rule systems through institutional entrepreneurship is inherent to any organizational 
field. This topographical understanding of fields has led institutional scholars to focus on 
the field position of potential entrepreneurs (e.g. Battilana, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991) and the maturity of the field itself as 
indicators of likely proponents of change and their resource- mobilization strategies for 
implementing it. Initially, institutional entrepreneurship was associated with disadvan-
taged actors located in the periphery of mature fields or with emerging fields, while entre-
preneurial action by central, elite participants in mature fields has been conceptualized 
only relatively late as “the toughest example of embedded action” (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006: 43). Below we elaborate on the association of field position and entrepre-
neurial potential, show how different empirical foci correspond to different phases of 
theory development, and explain how this correspondence shaped our understanding of 
institutional entrepreneurship in PSFs.
Institutional Entrepreneurship among Peripheral Actors and Emerging Fields
Early work on institutional entrepreneurship considers the field periphery a fertile breed-
ing ground for institutional entrepreneurs. The common understanding is that peripheral 
actors are disadvantaged by the existing rule system and therefore motivated to take 
entrepreneurial action. Simultaneously, they are also relatively remote from central 
organizational networks through which institutional prescriptions are enforced and 
therefore less caught by prevailing institutional arrangements. By contrast, central 
organizations are deemed to be privileged by the institutional status quo and subject to 
intense scrutiny by their peers, which make them more likely to conform to strong iso-
morphic pressures and not act as institutional entrepreneurs. In sum, peripheral actors 
are more likely to become institutional entrepreneurs because they stand to gain more, 
while risking less (e.g. Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Kraatz & 
Zajac, 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000).
Field center and periphery are less clearly defined in emerging fields, which also attract 
considerable empirical attention at this stage. As institutionalists become more interested 
in the structuration of institutional arrangements, they also begin to focus on processes 
of field construction (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Anand & Peterson, 2000; Hoffman, 1999; 
Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Russo, 2001; Sahlin- 
Andersson, 1996). Studying emerging fields helps them understand how actors socially 
construct a shared understanding of the environment that ties clusters of organizations 
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into a “recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148–9). They find 
that, in the absence of shared rules and dominant logics, fields consolidate around a 
central “issue” (Hoffman, 1999) or “attention focus” (Anand & Peterson, 2000). Whether 
these are industry awards (Anand & Peterson, 2000; Anand & Watson, 2004), child nutri-
tion concerns (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002), or environmental considerations 
(Hoffman, 1999; Lounsbury, 1997; Lounsbury et al., 2003), they interlock previously 
disparate organizations in a collective endeavor, and help them develop a shared under-
standing of their field.
Emerging fields are still relatively under- organized domains, characterized by weakly 
entrenched, relatively localized “proto- institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2002). Their con-
stituents recognize some degree of mutual interest, but interact sporadically rather than 
through a structured system of social positions. Hence, actors lack clearly delineated 
reference groups of dominant or peer organizations whose isomorphic demands they 
would have to observe. This ambiguity provides considerable opportunity and motiva-
tion for institutional entrepreneurs to act strategically, shape emerging institutional 
arrangements or standards to their interests, and secure for themselves a central and 
resourceful position in the emerging field (e.g. Fligstein & Mara- Drita, 1996; Garud, Jain, 
& Kumaraswamy, 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 
2004).
These choices to attend primarily to peripheral actors and emerging fields have meant 
that this strand of research has greatly advanced the notion of agency in institutional 
theory, but has done less for addressing the puzzle of embedded agency. Attention to 
dissatisfied actors as principal change agents is problematic insofar as they are considered 
relatively isolated from isomorphic pressures. Similarly, emerging fields are characterized 
by low institutionalization and weak isomorphic constraints on human agency. As a 
result, the concept of institutional entrepreneurship has predominantly been developed 
from cases of strong agency but weak embeddedness.
This empirical one- sidedness has been reflected in theory development as critics note 
that the resultant understanding of agency is overly voluntaristic, individualistic, and 
disembedded (e.g. Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Leca & Naccache, 2006; Lounsbury 
& Crumley, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002). Accounts of institutional entrepreneurship have 
been criticized for showing processes of institutional formation rather than transforma-
tion that are driven by “active, rational opportunists . . . ready to take any action for 
institutional change that will enhance their individual interests, unconstrained by existing 
institutional arrangements” (Seo & Creed, 2002: 240). They emulate a model of planned 
change with institutional entrepreneurs engaging in actions that are “purposive” 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), or “directed toward” (Lawrence, 1999) realizing a pre-
ferred institutional arrangement.
Disadvantaged actors may be more motivated to initiate and plan change, but they are 
also less equipped to make it stick. However, while the importance of mobilizing coali-
tions and socio- political resources has been recognized, the focus largely remained on the 
skills and characteristics of mobilizing actors (e.g. Fligstein & Mara- Drita, 1996; Garud 
et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004), rather than the activities of a collective. Accounts 
“evoke the image of a single organization acting innovatively” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007) or a heroic or “hyper-
muscular” (Lawrence et al., 2009) activist leading a movement of less empowered 
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followers, suggesting that this early research is more about entrepreneurs than entrepre-
neurship.
The increasing interest in emerging fields and field construction distracts institutional-
ists from research in mature fields, such as the established professions. With knowledge- 
intensive occupations such as management consulting, investment banking, engineering, 
or architecture aspiring to professional status, expertise- based definitions of profession-
alism confront professional ones (Brint, 1994) and favor resource- based over institu-
tional perspectives on these organizations. As exemplars of knowledge- intensive 
organizations (Alvesson, 1995, 2001; Empson, 2001; Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; 
Morris, 2001; Starbuck, 1992, 1993), PSFs are deemed instructive cases for advancing a 
knowledge- based theory of the firm (Grant, 1996), and their professional staff are prima-
rily considered as carriers of knowledge, not institutional norms. Similarly, the rise and 
increasing internationalization of PSFs draws attention to their management structures 
(e.g. Aharoni, 1993; Brock, Powell, & Hinings, 1999; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & 
Brown, 1996; Greenwood & Hinings, 1994; Maister, 1993), but not to their embedded-
ness in broader institutional arrangements. In this sense, even though the mid- 1990s 
produced a plethora of research in professional firms, little of it applied the institutional-
ist lens.
However, to address the criticisms discussed above and take seriously the embedded-
ness of agency in stable institutional structures, institutional entrepreneurship research 
re- oriented its empirical focus and attended to instances of institutional change initiated 
by privileged, central actors in mature fields who so far had been assumed to be strongly 
embedded and unmotivated to challenge the institutional status quo.
Embedded Action by Central Elites in Mature Fields
In response to critiques that initial accounts of institutional entrepreneurship somewhat 
overshot the mark of incorporating agency into institutional theory and lost sight of 
embeddedness, later studies work towards an understanding of “institutional entrepre-
neurship as embedded agency” (Garud et al., 2007). These efforts produce a trend to 
move away from emerging fields and focus on mature fields that have traditionally been 
associated with organizational homogeneity, and institutional stability (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).
Drawing on Seo and Creed’s (2002) “contradictions” framework, this line of research 
argues that the potential for entrepreneurship and change is inherent in most fields, 
because tensions between contradictory logics intensify as fields mature. Organizations 
at the interstices of different institutional prescriptions are more able, and often moti-
vated, to consider different responses to institutional pressures and initiate change (e.g. 
Djelic & Quack, 2003; Greenwood, Magán Díaz, Li, & Céspedes Lorente, 2010; 
Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 
2010; Reay & Hinings, 2005). As these fissures and contradictions run across fields, and 
not just their periphery, even elite organizations at the field center may become motivated 
and enabled to initiate change (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Rao, Monin, & 
Durand, 2003; Sherer & Lee, 2002). This type of actor was previously hypothesized to 
feel least motivated to challenge institutional arrangements, most constrained by institu-
tional pressures, and thus most firmly embedded, so that institutional entrepreneurship 
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originating in their midst constitutes an “exemplar of embedded agency” (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006).
As Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) elaborate, a subjectively perceived shortfall in 
performance vis- à- vis competitors is sufficient to instill a sense of dissatisfaction and 
motivate even elite actors to exploit their awareness of alternative institutional arrange-
ments to address their crisis. In this view, embeddedness becomes a relative rather than a 
binary phenomenon insofar as it influences the nature of the institutional contradictions 
actors experience, the institutional arrangements they can develop, and the economic or 
socio- political resources they can mobilize, so that “embedded” institutional entrepre-
neurs in mature fields combine characteristics that make them “both marginal and 
central” (Castel & Friedberg, 2009).
As institutional theorists engage more closely with contradictions and the transforma-
tion of existing institutional arrangements, they broaden their focus from institutional 
“creation” to include entrepreneurial efforts to “disrupt” or “maintain” existing arrange-
ments (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009). At the same time, attention 
migrates from institutional entrepreneurs to entrepreneurship, from questions of who the 
entrepreneurs are and where they are located to what they do and how they do it to 
accomplish the “institutional work” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) of (trans- )forming 
institutional arrangements according to their interests. Empirical research increasingly 
focuses on practical actions and interactions that reconstruct institutional arrangements 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Kellogg, 2009) or the rhetorical strategies that change agents 
employ to theorize and legitimize change (e.g. Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; 
Jones & Livne- Tarandach, 2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Munir & Phillips, 2005; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008; Zilber, 2006, 2007).
These studies also problematize the previously prevailing image of the “heroic” entre-
preneur who single- handedly takes on institutional structures. Institutional scholars 
more comprehensively engage with ideas from the social movement literature and begin 
to describe institutional entrepreneurship as a collective endeavor, bringing together a 
variety of actors who coalesce around their common project, but may not follow a specific 
organization’s lead (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; 
Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Rao et al., 2003; Reay, Golden- Biddle, & Germann, 2006; 
Wijen & Ansari, 2007).
Searching for strong cases of embedded action that illuminate the transformation of 
existing rather than the creation of new institutional arrangements, empirical work in this 
stream of research rediscovers classic professions such as accounting, healthcare, and law 
as fruitful research settings, exemplifying highly institutionalized fields. The apparent 
stability and strength of institutional structures in professional contexts, as well as the 
recognized role of professionals as institutionalized and institutionalizing actors (e.g. 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008), make professional contexts an appropriate 
empirical setting for studying embedded motivated action. Instead of the professions per 
se, however, institutionalists now attend to professional service firms as elite actors in 
mature fields. For instance, Greenwood and colleagues publish a series of papers on the 
efforts of the “Big Five” global accounting firms to legitimize multi- disciplinary practice 
as an appropriate organizational form (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg (2003) attend to 
the same set of elite organizations and their interactions with professional and regulatory 
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bodies in legitimizing new work practices. Sherer and Lee (2002) choose elite US law firms 
to document the demise of the highly institutionalized “Cravath”- style promotion 
system.
What has remained surprisingly underexplored in this extreme swing from emerging to 
mature fields, however, is those proto- professions and proto- professional firms whose 
institutional projects have made some progress, but whose organizational forms, prac-
tices, and logics cannot yet be considered fully institutionalized. These arenas, which we 
describe as “maturing” fields, combining characteristics of emerging and mature fields, 
may hold particular conditions for institutional entrepreneurship. Drawing on illustra-
tive data from the German management consulting field (Reihlen, Smets, & Veit, 2010), 
we explore those conditions and the strategies that consultancies employ to manipulate 
the institutional ramifications of their own existence and operation.
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN A MATURING 
FIELD: THE CASE OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING IN 
GERMANY
Management Consulting as a Maturing Field
We classify the management consultancy field in Germany as a “maturing” field, as it 
combines both emerging and mature properties. Management knowledge constitutes the 
central “issue” of the consulting field. Its creation, dissemination, and application 
connect consulting firms with academic institutions, media companies, and client firms, 
and outline a collective endeavor around which they can coalesce (Engwall & Kipping, 
2002; Faust, 2002a; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). Together, they form a “recognized 
area of institutional life” in the sense of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983: 148) field concept, 
namely a “fashion- setting community” that feeds on the “dramatization of newness” 
(Faust, 2002a).
Kipping and Armbrüster (1999) highlight that the relatively imprecise nature of the 
consultancy concept, the multitude of specializations, and the frequent change of prod-
ucts and producers complicate the definition of field boundaries. Unlike other profes-
sional business services such as law or accounting, management consulting is not a 
protected occupation that requires professional certification and accreditation 
(Armbrüster, 2006; Groß & Kieser, 2006; Kipping & Armbrüster, 1999). Industry asso-
ciations do exist, but they play a largely supporting and representative role, contrasting 
greatly with the formally accredited professional associations that regulate the practice 
of lawyers, accountants, and physicians. Industry associations provide opportunities for 
training and exchange, and they help small management consultancies to build credibility 
and reputation (Clark, 1995; Groß & Kieser, 2006). Hence, the isomorphic pressures 
commonly exerted by professional associations or the state are weak in the consultancy 
field (Armbrüster, 2006; Groß & Kieser, 2006). In this sense, the management consulting 
field is still emerging, characterized by residual institutional ambiguity and competing 
ideas of appropriate consulting practice.
Simultaneously, however, the perceived status of consultancy services and the way in 
which field constituents interact with and perceive each other show signs of increasing 
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field maturity. Although management consulting is still a relatively young industry, it has 
positioned itself as “the world’s newest profession” (McKenna, 2006), attaining quasi- 
professional status based on the knowledge intensity of its services (Brint, 1993; Groß & 
Kieser, 2006; Maister, 1993). Its large growth rates during the 1990s “were being added 
to a mature frame, not an adolescent skeleton” (McKenna, 2006), suggesting significant 
progress towards fuller institutionalization.
Another indicator of field maturity is the stratification of elites and non- elites, which 
differ in both scale and reputation (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Similar to the more 
traditional law (Empson, 2007a) and accounting professions (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006), whose highly reputable firms are collectively known as the “Magic Circle” and 
the “Big Five” respectively, the consulting field is clearly stratified along these dimen-
sions, distinguishing a small group of elite organizations from their peripheral competi-
tors in both the global and the German context. In 2006, the top ten consultancies in 
Germany (out of approximately 14 250 incumbents) controlled a market share of 18 
percent.1 With the exception of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, a leading national 
player, the German consulting market is dominated by the global elite of American 
consulting firms such as McKinsey & Co., Booz Allen Hamilton, and the Boston 
Consulting Group. Most of those firms entered the European market in the consulting 
boom of the “golden sixties” (Kipping, 1999) and established the significant presence 
they still enjoy today.
Hence, while the boundaries of the management consultancy field are relatively fuzzy, 
its center is very clear. The stratification of elite and non- elite organizations, combined 
with the fluidity of field participation, the absence of strong isomorphic pressures, and 
the resultant institutional ambiguity, suggests that management consulting is best 
described as a maturing field. Management consultancy is caught in limbo between early 
emergence and full structuration. This trait suggests that processes of institutionalization 
are ongoing, but that there is still considerable scope for entrepreneurs to shape maturing 
arrangements in ways that enhance their institutional capital (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Oliver, 1997).
Even more than in an emerging field, in a maturing field organizations may find par-
ticularly motivating and enabling conditions for strategic action. The lack of institutions 
of professionalism (Armbrüster, 2006; Groß & Kieser, 2006) creates institutional ambi-
guity and therefore weaker institutional constraints. Additionally, local or global elites 
can use their reputations and resourcefulness to shape maturing institutional structures 
to their advantage. The elites’ exposure to top clients and multiple industries also helps 
them influence institutional arrangements (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) and give direc-
tion to their institutional strategies. These institutional and organizational conditions 
enable strategic action, while the prospect of increased competitive advantage and eco-
nomic reward acts as a motivator. Given that institutional arrangements benefit the 
interests of their promoters, individual consultancies are motivated to promote rules and 
structures that enhance their institutional capital and competitive advantage (Lounsbury 
& Glynn, 2001; Oliver, 1997). These specific institutional conditions suggest that the 
management consultancy field is a particularly rich setting in which to explore strategies 
for creating and sustaining institutional capital.
Drawing on generic strategies by which self- interested actors may impose institutional 
constraints on other field participants (Lawrence, 1999) or relax their own (Oliver, 1991), 
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we analyze how consulting firms in Germany manipulate their institutional context to 
enhance their institutional capital (see especially Reihlen et al., 2010).
Co- optation and Lobbyism
The customization of consultancy services (Fosstenløkken, Løwendahl, & Revang, 2003) 
and the role of networked reputation in acquiring client projects (Glückler & Armbrüster, 
2003) mean that personal relationships play a strong role in selling consultancy services. 
Marketing measures are often personalized and aimed at forming networks with decision- 
makers in client organizations (Armbrüster & Barchewitz, 2004). Thus, the consultancy 
field is highly susceptible to personalized institutional strategies such as co- optation and 
lobbyism (see Oliver, 1991). In this specific case, co- opting may take one of two forms, 
depending on whether a stakeholder is imported into the consultancy or a consultant 
exported to co- opt an external stakeholder “from within.”
Because of the relationship- driven nature of their service, management consultancies 
focus on incorporating employees with existing personal networks into their own busi-
ness. This incorporation is exercised through lateral hires, the hiring of experienced 
professionals from competitors (Kaiser, 2004; Ringlstetter & Bürger, 2004). Especially 
when firms move into new areas of practice, experienced professionals who bring their 
personal networks of colleagues and clients may provide a crucial boost for business 
development (Malos & Campion, 1995).
A derivative of co- optation that is specific to consultancies and other professional 
service firms is known as outplacement (Maister, 1993), which does not rely on integrating 
important institutional decision- makers into the organization, but on placing loyal 
employees in client organizations or regulatory agencies. For many consulting firms with 
an “up- or- out” tournament promotion system (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Gilson & 
Mnookin, 1989), outplacement has become an institutionalized solution to infusing the 
organization with new ideas, but it has “also created a network of former employees who 
served as ambassadors . . . within other organizations that might otherwise have been 
wary of employing consultants” (McKenna, 2006). The prevalence of the outplacement 
strategy as an instrument for reinforcing consultant–client ties is illustrated by a survey 
of the professional backgrounds of the DAX- 30 board members.2
On average, 16 percent of all DAX- 30 board members have a background in manage-
ment consulting. The results ranged from 0 to 50 percent; figures close to 50 percent 
suggest close relationships between the corporation and the consulting field and in some 
cases with a specific consulting firm. Notably, in the chemical or automotive industry, 
where a strong life science or engineering background is desirable even among top execu-
tives, only one out of 36 board members has a consulting background. Conversely, 
DAX- 30 banks recruited one- third of their board members from among former manage-
ment consultants.
Given our indicator, by far the most successful firm in outplacing former employees 
into client organizations is McKinsey & Company,3 the industry leader in the German 
consulting market. Of all former consultants on DAX- 30 executive boards, 43 percent 
are former members of McKinsey. More importantly, in exceptional cases such as the 
Deutsche Post and the Deutsche Postbank, former employees of McKinsey occupy 50 
percent and 44 percent, respectively, of the top management positions. At the same time, 
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McKinsey has attained an informal status as “consultancy of choice” for both compa-
nies, reducing the volume of new business that competitors have been able to acquire. In 
2006, McKinsey generated an annual fee income of an estimated €80 million, accounting 
for approximately 13 percent of total fee income, from this relationship (Lixenfeld, 2008; 
Student, 2008). Although the survey of DAX- 30 companies is indicative, the alumni 
networks of large consultancies reach much further. McKinsey’s German alumni 
network comprises approximately 1800 managers (Reischauer, 2005), compared to about 
1000 former BCG consultants (Student, 2006).
The prospect of outplacement to prestigious client firms increases the attractiveness on 
the graduate labor market (Reischauer, 2005; Student, 2006). It creates institutional 
capital in that it helps attract new talent from leading business schools and fuels the con-
stant stream of new entrants that is needed to sustain the up- or- out promotion system. 
Additionally, consultants who have successfully been outplaced with clients can help 
their former employer secure a steady stream of new projects, based on good personal 
relationships and information advantages (Bresser & Millonig, 2003; McKenna, 2006). 
However, the benefit of these client–consultant ties is mutual, as clients can also benefit 
from employing former consultants. The employees’ inside knowledge of their former 
firm makes it possible for them to manage service delivery more effectively and to raise 
performance expectations (see van den Bosch, Baaij, & Volberda, 2005). For instance, 
former consultants in client organizations may have maintained good personal relation-
ships with partners in the consultancy through whom they can sanction low- performing 
consulting work.
Within new public management initiatives, management consultancies are increas-
ingly seconding members to government and policy- making committees (Bill & Falk, 
2006; Faust, 1998). A prominent example in Germany is the so- called “Hartz 
Committee” on labor market reform, to which McKinsey and Roland Berger Strategy 
Consultants seconded senior members. Work on policy- making committees builds 
reputation, but more importantly it constitutes a deliberate attempt to demonstrate the 
value of consulting services for society. Similar to client outplacements, these temporary 
endorsements represent a form of co- optation that enhances consultants’ institutional 
capital, creating public awareness and legitimacy for consulting work in this sector. Such 
a “committee first, then consulting” strategy (Manager Magazin, 2004) opens up the 
public sector as a new and lucrative market for consulting services. In 2004, public 
organizations spent about €1 billion on consulting fees, accounting for approximately 8 
percent of the total German consulting market (Falk, Rehfeld, Römmele, & Thunert, 
2006).
However, these efforts to build institutional capital also had unintended consequences 
that reduced it. As new stakeholders surfaced, government watchdogs began to scrutinize 
the government use of management consultancies; journalists and academics publicly 
questioned its legitimacy. The increasing influence of management consultants on politi-
cal decision- making is now met with great skepticism, as critics observe the emergence of 
a “republic of consultants” (Leif, 2006; Niejahr & Bittner, 2004) in which political 
decision- makers depend increasingly on external consulting expertise. Following a reso-
lution of the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag, the Federal Audit Office 
(Bundesrechnungshof) developed guidelines for government relations with, and the use 
of, management consultants (Bundesrechnungshof, 2006). Hence, when some elements 
Institutional entrepreneurship   307
of the institutional environment, but not others, are co- opted to align with organizational 
interests, unintended consequences for firms’ institutional capital can occur.
This means that the deliberate competitive or institutional strategies of individual firms 
may entail both positive and negative unintended consequences that drive the developing 
process of institutional change. Deliberate and emergent, and competitive and institu-
tional components of strategy influence each other through feedback loops. For instance, 
the deliberate outplacement of qualified consultants in client organizations solves the 
incentive problems of an up- or- out career system, but also creates an emerging pattern 
of organizational actions that may institutionalize the use of consultancies by clients. 
Similarly, consultants’ work on policy committees generates fee income and, at the same 
time, creates the incidental by- product that political consulting becomes increasingly 
indispensable and eventually taken for granted in the public sphere.
Membership
Membership strategies specify which organizations can legitimately exercise particular 
functions and thus derive benefits resulting from their activity. Nevertheless, in addition 
to Lawrence’s (1999) original conceptualization of membership strategies, we also find 
distinct non- membership strategies among German management consultancies.
Small and medium- sized consultancies pursue a membership strategy in Lawrence’s 
(1999) sense, in that they organize themselves in industry associations such as the 
Bundesverband Deutscher Unternehmensberater (BDU) or the RKW Beratungsnetzwerk. 
These associations, which serve as substitutes for established professional associations 
with regulatory functions, signal a minimum of consultancy competence and quality to 
potential clients (Groß & Kieser, 2006).
By contrast, for leading international consultancies such membership strategies are 
counterproductive. In the absence of a protected occupational title and formal profes-
sional accreditation, reputation serves as a proxy for quality. Hence, elite firms can use 
their reputation as a “membership criterion” and form a strategic group (McGee & 
Thomas, 1986) of management consultancies defined by elite status (Ferguson, Deephouse, 
& Ferguson, 2000). Their rigorous, strict demands serve to maintain the exclusivity of 
their circle and to establish a company- specific “micro- profession,” which is reinforced 
by in- house monitoring of quasi- professional principles (McKenna, 2006).4 This 
legitimation- qua- reputation gives elite consultancies access to knowledge and policy- 
making arenas in which best practices are created, validated, or diffused (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2001).
By steering clear of more inclusive industry associations, elite firms avoid reputational 
contamination and external institutional influence. In this sense, they pursue a non- 
membership, or exclusivity, strategy to enhance their individual institutional capital and 
weaken that of their smaller competitors.
Standardization
Standardization strategies define what is to be seen as normal, for example for a particu-
lar service. In this respect, membership and standardization strategies are interdependent, 
since both promote and eventually institutionalize consistent standards of professional 
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practice and service quality. Those consultancies that promote a standard—and which 
most likely already comply with it—automatically gain legitimacy advantages and 
enhance their institutional capital.
For instance, in an attempt to strengthen the collective reputation and legitimacy of 
the consulting profession, the BDU filed a request to the Ministry of Economics to 
protect the title Unternehmensberater (management consultant) under occupational law. 
According to the proposal, the title Unternehmensberater would be awarded on the basis 
of specific credentials, such as academic training or practical experience. But in December 
1997, after debates, the proposal was rejected by the ministry (Glückler & Armbrüster, 
2003; Groß & Kieser, 2006; Handelsblatt, 1997).
In accord with their non- membership strategy, elite consultancy firms with a strong 
position in their particular fields can use more subtle standardization strategies to 
enhance their individual, rather than the collective, institutional capital. These consultan-
cies can raise to the status of an institution those practices, procedures, and products in 
which they have competitive advantages. In this context, the creation of management 
fashions constitutes a standardization strategy. It at least temporarily institutionalizes 
concepts or practices by ascribing to them a value over and above their technical merit 
(Lawrence, 1999). Although fashions are transitory rationality myths and only weakly 
institutionalized, nevertheless while they last they are regarded as standards in their 
respective areas for the duration of their life- cycle. Their technical merit is not evaluated 
strictly by goal attainment, because their application confers benefits of perceived con-
formity with superior norms of rationality and progress (Benders & van Veen, 2001; 
Kieser, 1997; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001).
Consultancies as “expert theorizers” (Strang & Meyer, 1993) occupy privileged posi-
tions in arenas where the legitimacy of competing management innovations is constructed 
and contested. Within these arenas, their status enhances the impact and “positive nor-
mative emulation” of their ideas (Suchman, 1995). Thus, management fashions become 
important standardization devices of socially constructed business solutions. A consul-
tancy that successfully establishes its own concepts or procedures as temporary standards 
enhances its own institutional capital, because it develops market preferences that con-
strain its competitors, which are forced to adapt and subscribe to concepts or procedures 
in which they are at a technical disadvantage. Further, as the use of specific consulting 
services becomes a more standardized response to certain management problems, the 
standardization efforts of individual firms can build collective institutional capital for the 
entire industry.
Influence
Generally, the successful marketing of consultancy services depends on a positive percep-
tion of the engagement of consultants in the target industry. The strategic influence of 
such a fundamental attitude can endow consultancy services with normative, and eventu-
ally cognitive, legitimacy (Røvik, 2002; Suchman, 1995).
There is clear evidence that, in the past, consultancy firms have successfully influenced 
the value systems not only of their clients but also of society at large, so that the support 
services they provide to management teams and policy- makers have become taken for 
granted (Falk et al., 2006; Faust, 1998; McKenna, 2006; Suchman, 1995; Wimmer, 1992). 
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These observations resonate strongly with Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) argument that the 
modernization of society makes more areas of society accessible to the rules of rationality. 
Management consultancies have been able to use and propel this trend by reaching out 
to new groups of potential clients and applying their expertise to new types of problems 
which traditionally had not been open to their services (Ernst & Kieser, 2002b; Rudolph, 
2004).
Influencing strategies may involve other strategies of institutional manipulation, such 
as outplacement and secondment strategies. However, these strategies may be more wide- 
ranging, especially in areas where firms try to influence societal value systems more gener-
ally and open up new markets.
In the business sector, consulting firms can rely on their “systems of persuasion” 
(Alvesson, 1993) to create institutionalized myths that buffer their operations from ques-
tioning. Based on a study of self- presentations by various global management consultan-
cies on the internet, Bäcklund and Werr (2001) conclude that management consultancies 
use prevalent social myths of rationality, globalization, and universality to institutional-
ize their services as necessary components of successful management.
To influence value systems outside their traditional management domain, consultancies 
can use support strategies to demonstrate their value for political decision- making. Active 
engagement in social and environmental issues has also become an important mission for 
a large number of businesses that put corporate social responsibility and corporate citi-
zenship high on their agenda. Management consultancies can work “pro bono” to display 
their social responsibility, that is, deliver services for projects of social relevance free of 
charge (e.g. BCG, 2008; McKinsey, 2008b; Roland Berger, 2008a). However, these 
 initiatives also provide a strong platform for more wide- ranging societal strategies.
From the institutionalist perspective, pro bono work not only builds reputation as a 
socially responsible organization, but more importantly also creates impressions of ubiq-
uity that may be perceived as an indicator of acceptance and legitimacy. Pro bono work 
gives consultancy firms a legitimate presence in social domains that were previously not 
accessible to them owing to incompatible value systems. The large, elite consultancies 
especially have developed their status as the new “reflective elite” (Deutschmann, 1993; 
Faust, 2002a) or the “supra- experts” (Ernst & Kieser, 2002a) by applying their expertise 
pro bono to societal problems as diverse as climate protection (McKinsey, 2007), restruc-
turing the church (see Hardt, 2004; Neidhart, 1997), national innovation systems (BCG, 
2006), and city attractiveness (Roland Berger, 2008b). These initiatives counter negative 
public perceptions of consultants as hyper- rational cost- cutters. They build a legitimate 
basis of activity for consultancies in a wide range of societal sectors and thereby develop 
the consultancies’ individual and collective institutional capital. Consultancies’ individ-
ual efforts to manage their reputation collectively drive the institutionalization of 
 management consultancy throughout society.
However, we note that the influencing strategy should not be considered in isolation 
from other, superior institutional arrangements. For instance, from a historical perspec-
tive, it is clear that the influence of management consultancies in societies with traditional 
values of status, prestige, and authority is lower than in meritocratic societies, which 
stress functional values of effectiveness and efficiency (Faust, 2002b). Therefore, an 
important question is to what extent changes in social values can be influenced by 
 individual institutional entrepreneurs.
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CONCLUSION
Institutional entrepreneurship has become an emerging and increasingly important 
research area in the field of professional services. Institutionalists make important 
progress in understanding field- endogenous sources of institutional change. They blend 
new institutionalist ideas of embeddedness with “old” ideas of interest dissatisfaction 
(e.g. Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) and find ways of explain-
ing this motivation for change as inherent to mature institutional structures (Greenwood 
& Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). However, attention to dissatisfied actors as prin-
cipal change agents isolated from isomorphic pressures is problematic for addressing the 
paradox of embedded agency, since it appears to bypass rather than address the paradox 
of embedded agency. Similarly, studies of institutional change in emergent fields attend 
to contexts of low institutionalization and weak isomorphic constraints on human 
agency. As a result, concepts of endogenous change have predominantly been developed 
from cases of strong agency but weak embeddedness. Therefore, we have chosen manage-
ment consultancies which provide an interesting setting for studying embedded institu-
tional entrepreneurship owing to the institutional ambiguity and low pressures from 
“proto- institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2002) in this maturing field.
The findings of this study advance the understanding of institutional entrepreneurship 
in three partially interrelated ways. First, we contribute to the understanding of institu-
tional entrepreneurship in maturing fields. We attend to the previously neglected middle 
ground between emerging fields in which multiple structures, practices, and logics vie for 
predominance and mature fields with firmly entrenched institutional structures. We 
discuss the particular conditions that entrepreneurially minded actors find in maturing 
fields and that motivate and enable action in ways that differ from those previously 
documented in the literature. We outline a portfolio of strategies that institutional entre-
preneurs in our study employ and show how these strategies serve a dual purpose: creat-
ing individual competitive advantage and enhancing individual or collective institutional 
capital. This interplay of competitive and institutional strategy has previously received 
little attention.
Second, this study elaborates the concept of distributed agency (Quack, 2007), which 
becomes important when considering the field of management consultancies. There is 
typically no centralized control in the consulting field, since no single agency with a 
monopolized power position exists to dictate the behavior of other agents. The 
 co- presence of multiple types of actors like consulting firms, media, clients, business 
schools, and industry associations with different levels of involvement implies that agency 
is distributed across actors. With multiple localized actors contributing to an institutional 
change, the formation of institutional strategies may be better understood as the interplay 
of emergent and deliberate actions. In our case, deliberate actions to create individual 
competitive advantage for specific consulting firms created an emergent institutional 
strategy that can retrospectively be identified as having enhanced the institutional capital 
of the entire industry. As Mintzberg (1987a, 1987b) suggests, strategies need not be delib-
erate, but can also emerge from incremental and distributed patterns of actions. Although 
these have generally been viewed as mutually exclusive opposites, Quack (2007) has 
found institution building to involve both practitioners’ practical problem solving and 
firms’ deliberate political interventions.
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Third, departing from the idea of distributed agency and emergent strategy, the strate-
gic formation can be seen as a social movement in which the sum of disperse actions 
makes up the development of the institutional field. Traditionally, the implicit model of 
change has been one of planned change, in which dissatisfied actors engage in actions that 
are “intentional” (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006: 867), “purposive” (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006: 217), or “directed toward” (Lawrence, 1999: 168) realizing a new institu-
tional arrangement. This imagery of planned institutional change seems to discount not 
only the interference of conflicting interests by other field participants, but also early- 
stage experimentation in which an institutional change project takes shape. In contrast 
to this position, the dynamics in such an organizational field come from the collective 
behavior, which can be considered as a self- organizing system in which actors respond to 
their local environment resulting in global patterns of actions. For example, management 
fashions emerge from the non- orchestrated and collective action of distributed agents 
rather than individual endeavors, which proposes a new perspective on institutional 
strategy formation, opposing the idea of individual institutional entrepreneurship 
(Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Quack, 2007; Reay et al., 2006). 
Thus, in this context institutional strategies are the sum of deliberate individual strategies 
of distributed agents through which they intend to improve their own competitive posi-
tion. These emerging patterns of collective actions trigger institutional change through 
complex feedback loops between other organizations in the industry setting.
Avenues for future research can be found along different strands. Theoretically, insti-
tutional entrepreneurship research has to overcome individualistic approaches that 
portray entrepreneurship as an overly voluntaristic endeavor or develop collectivist 
approaches that regard entrepreneurship as a surrogate of collective meaning systems. 
Alternatively, a systemic approach to institutional entrepreneurship promises a meta- 
theoretical perspective that allows integrating agency and structure and blends the micro- 
and macro- foundations of institutional entrepreneurship (Reihlen, Klaas- Wissing, & 
Ringberg, 2007).
Empirically, maturing fields like management consulting are particularly interesting 
settings, which offer potential for further insights on organizational field formation, dis-
ruption, and reconstruction. Since institutional entrepreneurship has traditionally been 
investigated in emerging or mature fields, maturing organizational fields that are caught 
in limbo between structurally unconfined and highly embedded agents would further 
inform institutional theory. In empirical studies, the consulting industry can be further 
differentiated into strategic groups that show different behavioral patterns during proc-
esses of institution formation. The drivers for the self- organizing behavior of dispersed 
agents in this context also call for further research which explains the interplay among 
institutional agents and between agents and institutions.
NOTES
We would like to thank Elias Kaiser for his support during this research.
1. Calculations based on BDU (2007) and Lünendonk (2008).
2. The DAX- 30 lists the 30 largest German companies, publicly listed at Frankfurt stock exchange. It is the 
equivalent to the FTSE100 in London or the Dow Jones Index in New York. Information on consulting 
backgrounds was gathered from publicly available executive biographies.
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3. In the following we refer only to McKinsey.
4. For instance, McKinsey & Co’s firm- specific network alone, composed of 14 500 active consultants and 
18 000 alumni (McKinsey, 2008a), has more members than the BDU representing 530 firms covering 13 000 
individual consultants (BDU, 2009). This network makes it possible for McKinsey to act as a one- firm 
micro- profession.
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